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RESOLVING AMICUS CURIAE MOTIONS IN THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT AND BEYOND 
Carl Tobias* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Amicus curiae briefs are deeply woven into the fabric of 
modern federal appellate practice. Indeed, amici curiae sub-
mit briefs in approximately ninety percent of the cases that the 
United States Supreme Court entertains, and the Justices deny 
a minuscule number of amicus requests to participate. Ami-
cus practice is less ubiquitous in the United States Courts of 
Appeals. Amici seek to file comparatively few briefs, nearly 
all of which the appellate courts permit, while many tribunals 
have not developed a comprehensive jurisprudence for resolv-
ing amicus motions. Nonetheless, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has articulated rather strin-
gent criteria, which it has strictly applied to limit amicus in-
volvement, even as the Third Circuit has formulated less re-
strictive standards that the court has generously enforced to 
facilitate amicus participation. The significance of federal ap-
pellate court amicus practice will only grow as the twelve re-
gional circuits increasingly become the courts of last resort for 
their geographic areas because the Supreme Court hears so 
few appeals. These propositions mean that federal appellate 
court disposition of amicus curiae motions warrants assess-
ment, which this Article undertakes, concluding that the ap-
peals courts should generally follow the Supreme Court and 
Third Circuit approaches as illuminated by certain aspects of 
the Seventh Circuit treatment. 
The Article's second Part scrutinizes the origins and devel-
opment of amicus curiae practice in the Supreme Court and in 
the regional circuits. The next Part analyzes the contemporary 
debate over how the appellate courts should address amicus 
curiae requests to file briefs. More specifically, it compares the 
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criteria that the Seventh and Third Circuits have enunciated 
and how the courts have applied the standards. The segment 
detects variation in the regional circuits' practices, even 
though most appeals courts have not articulated a thorough 
amicus jurisprudence in published opinions. The Article con-
cludes by proffering suggestions for the future resolution of 
amicus curiae motions. The last Part recommends that appel-
late tribunals continue granting virtually all requests to submit 
briefs that amici make. The appeals courts should also capital-
ize on and carefully integrate superior dimensions of United 
States appellate jurisprudence related to amicus motions by 
essentially adopting the flexible Supreme Court and Third 
Circuit approaches, and by selectively applying the Seventh 
Circuit's criteria and its guidance, which amplifies the stan-
dards. 
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF AMICUS PRACTICE 
The origins and development of amicus curiae practice in 
the federal appellate courts might appear to deserve relatively 
limited exploration in this piece because numerous commenta-
tors have rather comprehensively assessed that history. 1 Non-
etheless, somewhat thorough examination of the background 
is appropriate, as the review should inform understanding of 
modern amicus practice, the contemporary debate over how 
appeals courts should decide amicus motions, and this issue's 
felicitous resolution. 
A. Supreme Court Practice 
Amicus curiae practice has been most prominent in the 
United States Supreme Court. Increasing numbers of amici 
have tendered briefs, and the Justices have traditionally been 
quite receptive to motions that amici file under Supreme Court 
Rule 37. This provision imposes practically no requirements 
other than that the submission inform the Court of the ami-
I. See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
315 (2008); Samuel Krislov, Tile Arrlicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 
694 (1963); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine 
Balance of Access, Efficiency and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LiTIG. 669 (2008); John Harrington, Note, 
Amici Curiae in tile Federal Courts of Appeals: How Friendly Are T11ey?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
667 (2005). 
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cus's interest and of "relevant matter not already brought to 
its attention by the parties," thus admonishing that amicus in-
put that repeats litigant contributions is disfavored, and few 
opinions have scrutinized or explained the rule's strictures.2 
The Justices have granted virtually all motions for leave to file 
amicus briefs, and numerous judges and legal scholars have 
observed that the Supreme Court effectively allows unlimited 
participation by amici and that the Justices will probably not 
modify this solicitous approach in the future. 3 An assessment 
published during 2000 concluded that amici tendered briefs in 
eighty-five percent of Supreme Court appeals and that the fig-
ure increased exponentially over the preceding half century.4 
Amicus filings have substantially affected the development of 
considerable Supreme Court substantive jurisprudence, figur-
ing prominently in such landmark opinions as Sweatt v. Pain-
ter, Regents of Cal. v. Bakke, and Roe v. Wade. 5 Several empirical 
studies have ascertained that the briefs have significantly in-
fluenced the Justices' determinations to grant petitions for 
writs of certiorari and the underlying Supreme Court deci-
sions on the merits.6 
2. N.Y. v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248 (1984) (addressing relevance); see SUP. Cr. R. 37(1) 
("[A] brief that does not" inform the Court of "relevant matter not already brought to its at-
tention by the parties ... burdens the Court and ... is not favored."); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 
U.S. l, 35-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); EUGENE GRESSMAN Er AL., SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE 734-40 (9th ed. 2007); infra notes 7, 9-11, 57-58 and accompanying text. 
3. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 647 (Higginbo-
tham, J., dissenting) (3d Cir. 1983); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before 
the Supreme Court: Wiza Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 784-87 (1990); Joseph 
D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 743, 762 (2000); Garcia, supra note 1, at 348. 
4. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 744; see also GRESSMAN Er AL., supra note 2, at 740-
41; JUDITHANNE SCOURFIELD MCLAUCHLAN, CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION AS AMICUS 
CURIAE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 28 (2005); Simard, supra note 1, at 686. 
5. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d at 647 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 340 
U.S. 846 (1950), Regents of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 767-74; Harrington, supra note 1, at 675-76; see Gre-
gory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1122 (1988). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3 (1961), the 
Court adopted a rule that only an amicus espoused, and in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 
(1989), it ruled on an issue "raised only in an amicus brief," but the Justices generally do not 
address issues that only amid raise. See, e.g., N.J. v. N.Y., 523 U.S. 767, 781 n.3 (1998); DelCos-
tello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 154 n.2 (1983); see also Kearney & Merrill, supra 
note 3, at 745 n.5; infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
6. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 787-811; Caldeira & Wright, supra note 5, at 1122; see 
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 35-36 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (expressing skepticism about amicus briefs); Ste-
phen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 26 (1998) (finding ami-
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B. Appeals Court Practice 
Amicus curiae practice is less widespread in the federal ap-
pellate courts, and a few regional circuits have developed a ju-
risprudence concerning amicus participation that appears 
somewhat more restrictive than that articulated by the Su-
preme Court. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, which 
governs amicus curiae practice, resembles Supreme Court 
Rule 37 and provides rather limited guidance.7 Federal and 
state governmental entities may file briefs without parties' 
consent or leave of court, but private amid must secure court 
permission, unless the litigants consent. 8 
A motion to file an amicus brief "must be accompanied by 
the proposed brief and state: (1) the movant' s interest and (2) 
the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the mat-
ters asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case." 9 This 
phraseology imposes interest, desirability, and relevance re-
quirements on amicus participation- (1) in comparison with 
Supreme Court Rule 37, which principally addresses interest 
and relevance, and (2) in contrast to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 24, which mandates that putative intervenors of right 
show they have an interest in the litigation that the case's reso-
lution will impair and that the parties will inadequately 
represent. 10 Rule 29' s three strictures are general and open-
ended, and the desirability and relevance notions are similar. 
Moreover, the Judicial Conference Appellate Rules Advisory 
Committee Note, which attended the provision's 1998 revi-
sion, admonished that the relevance phrasing was added to re-
flect analogous terminology in Supreme Court Rule 37(1) 
"[b]ecause the relevance of the matters asserted by an amicus 
is ordinarily the most compelling reason for granting leave to 
cus briefs help educate judges). As to the effect on certiorari, see Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 
161 (1942) and H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING To DECIDE 135-37 (1991). 
7. Compare SUP. CT. R. 37, witlz FED. R. APP. P. 29; see also supra notes 2, 5 and accompanying 
text; infra notes 11, 17, 57 and accompanying text. 
8. FED. R. APP. P. 29(a); see also SUP. CT. R. 37(2)-(4); infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
9. FED. R. APP. P. 29(b). This provision resembles SUP. CT. R. 37(3)(b). 
I 0. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 29(b), witlz SUP. CT. R. 37 and FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). See Thorn-
burgh, 699 F.2d at 646 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); Harrington, supra note 1, at 669. Success-
ful intervenors enjoy party status and benefits, such as discovery rights, which amici do not. 
See generally Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415 (1991); see also Thornburgh, 
699 F.2d at 646 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (contrasting a motion to intervene as a party 
with a motion for leave to file an amicus brief); infra notes 38, 40, 56 and accompanying text. 
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file," while the appellate courts allow amicus participation in a 
substantial percentage of circumstances. 11 A small number of 
regional circuits has developed a very comprehensive juri-
sprudence that implicates amid or has been particularly strict 
about policing amicus involvement, even though comparative-
ly recent opinions from Judge Richard Posner in the Seventh 
Circuit and Judge Samuel Alito in the Third Circuit have arti-
culated a relatively thorough jurisprudence, with Judge Posn-
er somewhat restrictively treating amicus participation. 12 
A few judges have interpreted the modern appellate rule to 
prohibit amid from addressing issues that parties have not 
raised, from introducing evidence that the litigants have failed 
to present, or from seeking relief that the parties have not re-
quested, even as other jurists have questioned these views. 13 
The appeals courts have relied on amicus briefs for numerous 
propositions, such as relevant factual information, pertinent 
legal issues, applicable statutory interpretations, and third 
party effects which judicial opinions might impose. 14 
Contemporary amid curiae no longer function solely as true 
friends of the courts as they conventionally did. 15 Rather, a 
modern amicus often has some type of adversary interest in 
the issues that the appeal presents, and can frequently be an 
extension of a party to the litigation. 16 Supreme Court Rule 37 
11. Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002); Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 
at 647 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); FED. R. APP. P. 29, 1998 advisory committee's notes; Gar-
cia, supra note 1, at 326; Harrington, supra note 1, at 670; see also supra notes 2-4, infra note 57 
and accompanying text. 
12. See generally Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003); Neona-
tology Assocs. v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002); see also infra notes 21-51 and accompa-
nying text. 
13. See Resident Council of Allen Parkway Vill. v. HUD, 980 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1993). 
The rarefied nature of this debate is illuminated by the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378, 383-84 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff don other grounds sub nom. Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see also Harrington, supra note 1, at 673; supra note 5; infra note 
14 and accompanying text. 
14. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 221 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 314 F.3d 79, 98 (2d Cir. 2002); Koote-
nai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1116 n.19 (9th Cir. 2002); Jn re Paschen, 296 F.3d 
1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 5, 13 and accompanying text; infra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 131; GRESSMAN Er AL, supra note 2, at 740; 
Krislov, supra note l, at 697, 703; Harrington, supra note 1, at 673; see also infra notes 28-30, 32-
33, 38-40 and accompanying text. 
16. See generally Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d 542; Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 131; Krislov, 
supra note l, at 703; infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
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and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 recognize those 
distinctions and specifically provide for them. 17 
Practically all of the empirical data that has been collected, 
analyzed, and synthesized on amicus involvement relates to 
the Supreme Court (although a study of filings during 2002 
did evaluate amicus participation in the regional circuits), 
while numerous judges and writers have observed that ap-
peals courts freely grant amid leave to file briefs. 18 The survey 
conducted in 2002 ascertained that appellate court amicus in-
volvement was significantly less pervasive than before the Su-
preme Court: amid tendered 635 briefs in 413 out of approx-
imately 5000 reported appellate cases. 19 The study asserted 
that amicus submissions appeared to impose a much "greater 
burden on the Supreme Court," while amicus briefs filed with 
the regional circuits were "not increasing at a rate that would 
cause a substantial burden in the near future ... [and were] ac-
tually becoming a smaller portion of" the appellate courts' 
growing responsibilities, which could be attributed to docket 
expansion.20 
In short, the Supreme Court generously addresses amicus 
curiae requests to participate and experiences amicus in-
volvement in a high percentage of cases. Most of the regional 
circuits similarly treat amicus motions, although the tribunals 
encounter significantly less frequent amicus participation, and 
relatively few tribunals have elaborated their jurisprudence 
through published opinions. The next section, accordingly, 
evaluates how the appellate courts resolve amicus requests. 
Ill. MODERN APPELLATE COURT RESOLUTION OF AMICUS 
MOTIONS 
A majority of the twelve federal appeals courts has not sys-
17. SUP. CT. R. 37; FED. R. APP. P. 29; see also supra notes 2, 8-11 and accompanying text. 
18. See Harrington, supra note 1, at 670, 676-78; see also supra note 11 and accompanying 
text; infra notes 36, 49-50 and accompanying text. But see infra note 33. 
19. Harrington, supra note 1, at 678-88; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 39, Supp. tbl. S-3 (2002), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/ contents.html (click on the link for Table S-3). A 2007 
survey of appellate court judges yielded similar conclusions. See Simard, supra note 1, at 686-
87. 
20. Harrington, supra note 1, at 679-80; see also Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133; infra 
note 48 and accompanying text. But see Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 544; infra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
2009] RESOLVING AMICUS CURIAE MOTIONS 131 
tematically enunciated criteria for addressing amicus curiae 
motions to participate or applied standards that the regional 
circuits have articulated. However, a few appellate courts, 
most notably the Seventh and Third Circuits, have formulated 
more comprehensive approaches, and their jurisprudence 
warrants emphasis in this section. The restrictive Seventh Cir-
cuit treatment is evaluated first because it most thoroughly, 
expressly, and clearly enunciates and enforces the relevant 
standards. However, the flexible Third Circuit approach 
seems preferable, as its articulation and application of the per-
tinent criteria facilitate greater amici involvement. 
A. Seventh Circuit 
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner has authored three 
opinions for the appeals court that comprehensively formulate 
the standards for resolving amicus curiae motions and how 
the tribunal should enforce the criteria as well as the justifica-
tions for enunciating restrictive standards that jurists strin-
gently applied. The Voices for Choices v. Illinois Bell Telephone 
Company2 determination warrants emphasis because it is more 
recent than the National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheid-
ler2 and Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission23 deci-
sions and incorporates virtually all of the guidance that the 
earlier opinions provided. 
Judge Posner first instructed that allowing an amicus to 
submit a brief "is a matter of 'judicial grace"' and that Seventh 
Circuit judges have not granted "rote permission to file such a 
brief, and in particular they will deny permission to file an 
amicus brief that essentially duplicates a party's brief."24 The 
jurist then espoused several reasons for the appellate court's 
policies: 
U]udges have heavy caseloads and therefore need to 
minimize extraneous reading; amicus briefs, often soli-
cited by parties, may be used to make an end run 
around court-imposed limitations on the length of par-
21. 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003). 
22. 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000). 
23. 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997). Judge Posner wrote Voices for Choices and Ryan in cham-
bers, while he authored Scheidler for a three judge panel. 
24. Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 544 (citing Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 617). 
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ties' briefs; the time and other resources required for 
the preparation and study of, and response to, amicus 
briefs drive up the cost of litigation; and the filing of an 
amicus brief is often an attempt to inject interest group 
politics into the federal appeals process.25 
Judge Posner next stated that "the criterion for deciding 
whether to permit the filing of an amicus brief should be . . . 
whether the brief will assist the judges by presenting ideas, 
arguments, theories, insights, facts, or data that are not to be 
found in the parties' briefs."26 The jurist elaborated by observ-
ing that the standard will more likely be satisfied in: 
case[s] in which a party is inadequately represented; or 
in which the would-be amicus has a direct interest in 
another case that may be materially affected by a deci-
sion in this case; or in which the amicus has a unique 
perspective or specific information that can assist the 
court beyond what the parties can provide.27 
Judge Posner then remarked that in his two-decade expe-
rience on the federal appellate bench it was "very rare for an 
amicus curiae brief to do more than repeat in somewhat dif-
ferent language the arguments in the brief of the party whom 
the amicus is supporting."28 
When Judge Posner applied the guidance that he enunciated 
to the briefs which amid proffered, the jurist determined that 
the papers included "a few additional citations not found in 
the parties' briefs and slightly more analysis on some points, 
[but] essentially they cover the same ground [as] the appel-
25. Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 544 (citing Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 616); accord Jaffee v. Red-
mond, 518 U.S. l, 35-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (regarding the injection of interest group 
politics). See also Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947); supra note 6. But see infra notes 48, 
56-66 and accompanying text. 
26. Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 545; see also Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Ex-
amining the Tnfluence of Arrlicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & 
Soc'Y REV. 807, 815-16 (2004); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and junk 
Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 94 (1993); infra notes 58-62 
and accompanying text. 
27. Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 545 (citing Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 616-17; Ryan, 125 F.3d at 
1063); accord Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (regarding inadequate representation). But see infra notes 38-43, 60-61 and accompa-
nying text. 
28. Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 545; see also infra note 32 and accompanying text. But see 
Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 221 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). 
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lants, in whose support they wish to file." 29 Judge Posner fur-
ther instructed that this was not a situation: 
in which a party is inadequately represented, or the 
would-be amici have a direct interest in another case 
that may be materially affected by a decision in this 
one, or they are articulating a distinctive perspective or 
presenting specific information, ideas, arguments, etc. 
that go beyond what the parties whom the amici are 
supporting have been able to provide.30 
Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the earliest of 
the three Seventh Circuit determinations, offers additional in-
sights. Judge Posner, denying an amicus motion, explained 
that there was a tendency on the part of numerous Seventh 
Circuit members, including himself, to grant motions without 
carefully evaluating why an amicus brief was desirable, even 
though Rule 29 requires jurists to undertake this kind of as-
sessment.31 Judge Posner asserted that those requests war-
ranted scrutiny "in a more careful, indeed, a fish-eyed, fa-
shion" because after sixteen years of reading them, the jurist 
determined the vast majority has "not assisted the judges 
[and] are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the argu-
ments made in the litigants' briefs, in effect merely extending 
the length of the litigant's brief ."32 The jurist contended that 
"these briefs should not be allowed. They are an abuse." 33 
B. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit opinion in Neonatology Associates v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue34 sharply contrasts with, and es-
29. Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 545; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text; infra 
note 32 and accompanying text. 
30. Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 545; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
31. See Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063; see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; infra note 57 
and accompanying text. 
32. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
33. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063. 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3975 (3d ed. Supp. 2008) finds little evidence 
that jurists outside the Seventh Circuit share Judge Posner's views and freely grant amici mo-
tions, and that Thornburgh is the last published opinion denying a motion. For additional 
analysis of the Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, see Garcia, supra note l; Harrington, supra note 
l; see also infra notes 36-37, 41-43 and accompanying text. 
34. 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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sentially rejects, the line of Seventh Circuit precedent that re-
strictively treats amicus participation. However, Judge Sa-
muel Alito wrote that decision before Judge Posner published 
the Voices for Choices opinion. The Third Circuit jurist did sub-
scribe to a few ideas championed by Judge Posner in Voices for 
Choices or the two earlier determinations. 
The appellants in the Neonatology Associates case contended 
that amici did not satisfy the requirements that the movants be 
impartial and support unrepresented or inadequatelX 
represented parties, which Rule 29 purportedly imposed: 5 
Judge Alito observed that the appellants premised their argu-
ments on a "small body of judicial opinions that look with dis-
favor on" amicus briefs, including two Seventh Circuit deci-
sions, but the appellants claimed that the "restrictive 
standards espoused in these opinions represent the views of 
'the judiciary' and are 'settled law' 'in this jurisdiction."' 36 The 
jurist rejected appellants' contentions, suggested that the strict 
interpretation was not Third Circuit law, decided that a 
broader construction was appropriate, and held that amici sa-
tisfied the strictures in Rule 29.37 
Judge Alito first ascertained that appellants' insistence that 
amicus be impartial "was once accurate and still appears in 
certain sources [but] ... became outdated long ago[,]" while 
the perspective was "difficult to square with ... Rule 29' s 'in-
terest' requirement, [that] weighs strongly against the appel-
lants' argument."38 The jurist concomitantly determined that 
35. See id. at 130-32; see also supra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text; infra notes 59-60 and 
accompanying text. 
36. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 130 (citing Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 
F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000); Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 
1997)); see also supra notes 18, 33 and accompanying text. 
37. See Neonatologi; Assocs., 293 F.3d at 130-33. 
38. Id. at 131 (citations omitted). The jurist found it "particularly difficult to reconcile im-
partiality and interestedness if the latter requirement is interpreted as a panel of our court did 
in [Tiwrnburglz]." Td. Thornburgh denied an amicus motion "because the proposed amici, a 
group of law professors, 'd[id] not purport to represent any individual or organization with a 
legally cognizable interest in the subject matter at issue, and [gave] only tlzeir concern about the 
manner in whiclz tlzis court will interpret the law." Td. (citing Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d at 644, 645 (3d. Cir. 1983)) (emphasis added). He found it 
"would be virtually impossible for an amicus to show that it is 'an impartial individual .. . 
whose function is to advise in order that justice may be done' but not a person who is 'only .. . 
concern[ed] about the manner in which [the] court will interpret the law."' Neonatology As-
socs., 293 F.3d at 131. The Thornburgh majority seemed to assimilate improperly Rule 29 to civ-
il rule 24' s intervention of right strictures, as the dissent recognized by stating, "amici have 
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the appellants' suggestion that the phrase amicus curiae indi-
cates some impartiality was 11 contrary to the fundamental as-
sumption of our adversary system that strong (but fair) advo-
cacy on behalf of opposing views promotes sound decision 
making." 39 He concluded that 11 [t]he argument that an amicus 
cannot be a person who has a 'pecuniary interest in the out-
come' also flies in the face of current appellate practice."40 
Judge Alito similarly registered disagreement with the con-
tention that amid must show the partf supported is inade-
quately represented or unrepresented.4 The jurist observed 
that "Rule 29 does not contain any such provision, [so to be] 
valid it must represent an 'elaboration' on the [provision's] 
'"desirability' [stricture]."42 However, in Judge Alito's view, 
that requirement was 11 most undesirable" because 11 an amicus 
may provide important assistance to the court," even when 
parties are well represented, recounting several cogent exam-
ples. 43 
The jurist then characterized the desirability criterion in 
Rule 29 as open-ended and argued that 11 a broad reading is 
prudent."44 Because the judges who must resolve an amicus 
motion at an appeal's rather nascent stage experience difficul-
ty ascertaining the value of a brief and may not ultimately de-
cide the case, the jurist found it "preferable to err on the side 
of granting leave."45 
not filed a motion to intervene as a party" but sought to share their views on a critical consti-
tutional issue, as had many amici. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d at 646-47 (Higginbotham, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis omitted). Judge Ali to intimated that he favored the dissent' s view. See Neona-
tology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 131. 
39. Neonatologi; Assocs., 293 F.3d at 131; see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
40. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 131. "A quick look at Supreme Court opinions disclos-
es that ... parties with 'pecuniary' interests appear regularly as amici," while some cases with 
the most amici "illustrate this point." Td. at 131-32; see also GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 
740; supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text; infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
41. See Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 132; see also infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
But see supra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text. 
42. Neonatologi; Assocs., 293 F.3d at 132. 
43. Td. (citing Luther T. Munford, When Does tile Curiae Need An Arrlicus?, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 279 (1999)) ("Some amicus briefs collect background or factual references that merit 
judicial notice [or] ... are entities with particular expertise not possessed by any party to the 
case. Others argue points deemed too far-reaching for emphasis by a party intent on winning 
a particular case. Still others explain the impact a potential holding might have on an indus-
try or other group."); see also supra notes 9, 11 and accompanying text; infra notes 57-58 and 
accompanying text. 
44. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 132. 
45. See id. at 132-33. Judge Alito added that a merits panel can easily detect an unhelpful 
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Judge Alito next enunciated several contentions against a re-
strictive policy for addressing amici motions. First, the jurist 
observed that a restrictive approach might "create at least the 
perception of viewpoint discrimination."46 Second, the judge 
found this practice "may also convey an unfortunate message 
about" the court's openness.47 Third, the jurist believed that a 
restrictive policy was an "unpromising strategy for lightening 
a court's work load" because skeptical scrutiny in the motions 
phase may be as time-consuming as evaluation at the merits 
stage, and "unhelpful amicus briefs surely do not claim more 
than a very small part of a court's time."48 
For all of the reasons examined above, Judge Alito asserted 
that the Third Circuit "would be well advised to grant motions 
for leave to file amicus briefs unless it is obvious that the pro-
posed briefs do not meet Rule 29' s criteria as broadly inter-
preted."49 The jurist thought this approach comported "with 
the predominant practice in the courts of appeals." 50 Judge 
Alito concluded by applying the law he had articulated to the 
facts and determined that amici had satisfied the interest, re-
levance, and desirability constituents in the rule. 51 
C. Additional Cases 
The Seventh and Third Circuits are the only appellate courts 
that have specifically and thoroughly addressed Rule 29' s 
standards for deciding amicus motions. However, a few re-
brief and simply disregard it but admonished that a good brief' s rejection means the panel 
"will be deprived of a resource." Td. at 133. 
46. Td. at 133 ("Unless a court follows a policy of either granting or denying motions for 
leave to file in virtually all cases, instances of seemingly disparate treatment are predictable."). 
47. id. For views that agree with this idea and those cited supra in note 46 and accompany-
ing text, see Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 934, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also infra notes 73-74 and 
accompanying text. 
48. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text; infra 
note 73 and accompanying text. But see supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
49. See Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
50. See Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133 (citing MICHAELE. TIGAR AND JANE B. TIGAR, 
FEDERAL APPEALS-JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE 181 (3d ed. 1999); ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 307-08 (2d ed. 1989)); accord Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gy-
necologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 646-47 (3d Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); 
supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
51. See Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133; see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
For additional analysis of the Third Circuit jurisprudence, see Garcia, supra note l; Harring-
ton, supra note 1. 
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gional circuits have touched on the issues that the Seventh and 
Third Circuits have squarely treated. For example, in the con-
text of addressing an attorney's fees request for preparing an 
amicus brief, the Eleventh Circuit invoked Voices for Choices for 
the notion that parties frequently solicit amicus briefs as a 
means to avoid court-imposed page limitations.52 The Ele-
venth Circuit denied the attorney's fees request and con-
demned this idea, declaring that compensating a non-party 
organization or group for the "work would encourage the 
practice, which we are loathe to do."53 Numerous district 
courts have also relied on the Seventh and Third Circuit de-
terminations to resolve amicus motions, although these opi-
nions minimally elaborate the appellate precedent and are 
beyond this Article's scope. 54 
In sum, the overwhelming majority of regional circuits has 
not enunciated a comprehensive jurisprudence for resolving 
amicus curiae motions in published opinions, while the stan-
dards that the appeals courts use and their application vary 
and remain unclear. Moreover, the two appellate courts that 
have articulated the most fully-developed jurisprudence pro-
vide somewhat less clarity than they might and are in tension. 
For example, the Seventh Circuit has thoroughly and clearly 
enunciated the criteria for resolving amicus motions but has 
enforced them too restrictively, while the Third Circuit has ar-
ticulated the standards with insufficient specificity and clarity 
even as the court has applied the criteria using the appropriate 
degree of flexibility. Thus, the last portion affords recommen-
dations for future treatment of amicus motions by selectively 
extracting and carefully meshing the best aspects of the Su-
preme Court as well as the Seventh and Third Circuit juri-
sprudence. 
52. Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Voices for Choices v. Ill. 
Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Garcia, supra note l, at 328. See generally 
supra notes 25, 28-30, 32-33 and accompanying text. 
53. Glassroth, 347 F.3d at 919; see Harrington supra note 1, at 672. Boumediene v. Buslz, 476 
F.3d 934, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff don other grounds 
sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); and Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) treat the importance of amici and their participation's breadth, but do not directly ad-
dress the criteria. For recent controversies involving Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit amici, 
see Garcia, supra note 1, at 330-31. 
54. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 246 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2003); Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc., 
49 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Nev. 1999); U.S. v. Alkaabi, 223 F. Supp. 2d 583 (D.N.J. 2002); see also 
Garcia, supra note l, at 329-30; Harrington, supra note l, at 671. 
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Suggestions 
All twelve regional circuits must enunciate as thoroughly 
and clearly as possible the criteria for resolving amicus curiae 
motions, while the appeals courts should generously enforce 
the standards to facilitate efficacious amicus involvement. The 
regional circuits must define and elaborate the criteria that go-
vern requests to participate and flexibly apply them in pub-
lished opinions. If these case-specific efforts prove insuffi-
cient, the United States Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules may want to consider the 
amendment of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, while 
the twelve individual appellate courts might wish to assess re-
vision of that command's local analogues. 
More particularly, the regional circuits should articulate 
comprehensive and lucid definitions of Rule 29' s interest, desi-
rability and relevance strictures. The interest concept appears 
less important and seems designed in part to deter litigants 
from recruiting amid that will facilitate their avoidance of 
page-limitation mandates.55 The interest language might con-
comitantly be seen as a vehicle for guaranteeing amicus com-
mitment to litigation of the issues at stake by analogy to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 24' s interest prong for 
intervention of right or to the standing doctrine. However, 
this approach may improperly conflate appellate Rule 29 and 
civil rule 24 by effectively assimilating the idea of amicus, 
which does not confer party status, to the concept of interve-
nor, which does. That view apparently contravenes the Rule 
29 drafters' intent.56 
The desirability and relevance requirements in Rule 29 seem 
analogous. Moreover, the Advisory Committee Note, which 
accompanied the rule's 1998 amendment, instructed that the 
language was inserted to mirror wording in Supreme Court 
Rule 37(1), as the relevance of the input that an amicus prof-
fers is typically the most critical reason for granting a motion.57 
55. See supra notes 9-10, 16-17, 25, 27, 52-53 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 28, 38-43 and accompa-
nying text. 
57. FED. R. APP. P. 29, 1998 advisory committee's note; see also supra notes 2, 7, 11 and ac-
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Indeed, desirability appears to lack much independent mean-
ing because an amicus contribution that is relevant should 
usually be desirable. 
Regardless of whether desirability and relevance have dis-
crete applicability, Judge Posner seemed to distill their essence 
when he stated that the criterion for allowing amicus partici-
pation is "whether the brief will assist the judges by present-
ing ideas, arguments, theories, insights, facts or data that are 
not to be found in the parties' briefs."58 Less helpful is Judge 
Posner's elaboration of circumstances in which the standard 
more likely will be satisfied: a party is inadequately 
represented or the putative amicus possesses a "direct interest 
in another case" that the instant appeal's resolution could ma-
terially affect or offers a unique viewpoint or particular ma-
terial which may aid the court.59 The inadequate representa-
tion concept is not as valuable for the reasons that Judge Alito 
trenchantly explained;60 the direct interest notion is less useful 
because of the concepts mentioned immediately above;61 and 
the unique perspective or specific information that can assist 
the court ideas are not so helpful, as they effectively reiterate 
the criterion. 62 In short, the fundamental question is whether 
the amicus could make a contribution that promises to im-
prove the quality of judicial decision-making by supplying in-
put that the parties have not afforded. 
The twelve regional circuits should flexibly apply the crite-
ria for permitting amicus participation. Thus, when the issue 
of whether a particular amicus has satisfied Rule 29' s require-
ments is unclear or presents a close question, judges should 
broadly read the proviso and "err on the side of granting 
leave."63 Judges should also canvass and apply measures that 
will be responsive to the concerns, namely resource costs im-
companying text. 
58. See supra notes 26, 30, and accompanying text. Thus, an amicus brief that reiterates the 
ideas that a party's brief includes would not satisfy Rule 29. See supra notes 2, 11 and accom-
panying text. Other judges articulate similar notions. See sources cited supra notes 5, 14, and 
39. 
59. See supra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
62. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
63. Neonatology Assocs.v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2002); see supra notes 44-
45, 49 and accompanying text. 
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posed on jurists and parties, especially by redundant amicus 
input, and efforts to avoid page limitations, which Judge 
Posner has articulated.64 Techniques, such as further narrow-
ing page restrictions, may save court and litigant expense, 
while judges have generally been able to identify end-runs 
around these limitations, partly by consulting amici submis-
sions that ostensibly satisfy the interest requirement, and to 
detect repetitive amici contributions.65 However, jurists 
should accord relatively little weight to Judge Posner's con-
cern that amici will inject interest group politics into the appel-
late process because many amici do so now, and this may es-
sentially be intrinsic to their participation or to numerous 
controversial issues, such as questions involving abortion, re-
ligion, and terrorism, which litigants request that appeals 
courts resolve.66 Moreover, jurists should always remember 
that they might simply choose to forego reliance on amicus in-
put that lacks persuasiveness or reiterates party contributions. 
The case-by-case treatment suggested above could prove de-
ficient. For example, it may foster conflicting interpretations 
among the circuits, require too many resources, or not work 
because of Rule 29' s phrasing or judicial resistance to the ap-
proach. If this occurs, the Appellate Rules Advisory Commit-
tee might consider amending the proviso, while the regional 
circuits may want to alter their corresponding local rules. 67 
For instance, the Advisory Committee might elide the desira-
bility and relevance ideas and specifically define and elaborate 
the notion by using concepts that implicate enhanced judicial 
decision-making, such as the introduction of new legal argu-
ments or factual data, which the Seventh Circuit has pro-
64. See supra notes 25, 28-30, 32-33 and accompanying text; see also supra note 55 and ac-
companying text. 
65. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 25, 28-30, 32-33 and 
accompanying text. For other techniques, see infra note 70. An amicus brief may not exceed 
"one-half the maximum length authorized ... for a party's principal brief." FED. R. APP. P. 
29(d). 
66. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also Garcia, supra note l, at 331-33; supra 
note 38. 
67. Judges have not mentioned these ideas in opinions addressing amici motions. The 
Advisory Committee and analogous circuit rules committees study the rules and formulate 
suggestions for improvement. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-75, 2077 (2000); Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 passim (1982); Carl Tobias, Tmproving the 1988 
and 1990 Judicial Tmprovements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1591-98 (1994). 
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pounded.68 The appellate courts may follow this approach or 
revise their local rules to include features that some tribunals 
have prescribed.69 Illustrative is the Ninth Circuit, which ad-
monishes that filing multiple amici "briefs raising the same 
points in support of one party is disfavored," while it encou-
rages "[a]mici who wish to join in the arguments or factual 
statements of a party or other amici ... to file and serve on all 
parties a short letter so stating.'t7° 
B. Justifications 
Numerous reasons support these suggestions. Several 
process values appear most important to the prescription for 
generous resolution of amicus motions.71 The idea that amicus 
participation can improve judicial decision-making by, for ex-
ample, introducing new legal theories or contentions or differ-
ent statutory interpretations, supplying additional factual in-
formation, or affording novel, convincing public policy 
arguments, is critical.72 Numerous additional practical and 
policy reasons, which Judge Alito enunciated against restric-
tive application of the Rule 29 criteria, support the proposal 
that jurists flexibly apply the standards. These include the dif-
ficulties entailed in motions panels' efforts to ascertain the 
contributions that amici will make, and the concomitant no-
tion that a restrictive policy is an unpromising strategy to re-
duce judicial workloads as well as avoiding the perceptions of 
68. See supra notes 26, 57-58 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 9-11, 39 and ac-
companying text. 
69. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. LOCAL R. 29(a); 5TH CIR. LOCAL R. 29.2; see also Am. Coll. of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 646 n.2 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (3d 
Cir. 1983); Garcia, supra note 1, at 322-23. Seven regional circuits have prescribed no local ana-
logue. 
70. See 9TH CIR. LOCAL R. 29-1, advisory committee's note. The committee and the circuits 
may even want to consider more fundamental reform to amicus motions, such as applying 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11' s strictures (especially its requirement for certifying sub-
missions' propriety) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26' s strictures (especially its require-
ment for expert witness reports). See Garcia, supra note 1, at 349-52 (Rule 11 idea); Simard, 
supra note 1, at 709 (Rule 26 idea). See generally Keith Beyler, Expert Testimony Disclosure Under 
Federal Rule 26: A Proposed Amendment. 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 117 (2007); Carl Tobias, The 
1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L. J. 171 (1994). 
71. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL 
L. REV. 270 (1989). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1463, 1466-71 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX 
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1985)). 
72. See, e.g., supra notes 26, 39, 58 and accompanying text. 
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viewpoint discrimination and that courts are not open to the 
public.73 Amicus involvement may also enhance court trans-
parency, judicial accountability, and the legitimacy and public 
acceptability of appellate substantive determinations regard-
ing controversial questions. 74 Promoting access to courts as 
well may foster important first amendment values, such as 
freedom of speech and the right to petition.75 
The appellate courts should thoroughly articulate the rele-
vant criteria and generously apply them in published opi-
nions. Those endeavors will best facilitate lawyer and party 
access to pertinent requirements, their interpretation and ap-
plication, as well as compliance with those strictures, while 
promoting input that enhances judicial decision-making. If 
this proves infeasible, or if Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 29 or its local counterparts warrant amendment, the Ad-
visory Committee or the regional circuits should institute 
these revisions to foster public access and improve the courts' 
substantive determinations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Surprisingly few of the twelve regional circuits have articu-
lated comprehensive standards for resolving motions to file 
amicus briefs in published opinions. The appellate courts 
should thoroughly develop criteria and flexibly enforce the 
standards by drawing on the jurisprudence that the Supreme 
Court as well as the Seventh and Third Circuits have enun-
ciated because these actions will facilitate amicus input that 
enhances judicial decision-making. 
73. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
74. See Burbank, supra note 71, at 1466-71; see also Carl Tobias, Fourth Circuit Publication 
Practices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1733, 1753 (2005). 
75. See Garcia, supra note 1, at 319-20. But see supra notes 25, 66 and accompanying text. 
